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Abstract
Despite the relatively large number of gas stations reached in Spain after decades
of sectorial reforms, pre-tax fuel prices in the country remain systematically among
the highest in the EU. The literature provides evidence suggesting that a low intensity
of competition in the retail distribution could contribute to these casual observations.
With the purpose of shedding light on ways to design e↵ective competition measures,
we conduct an empirical analysis of more than ten million observations containing in-
formation about prices, brands, and locations at the station level. This allows us to
know whether the exit (entry) of some classes of stations have the ability to reduce the
prices of nearby competitors. Our results suggest that the presence in a local market
of a station belonging to the network of the dominant market companies will tend to
generate prices above the average. This is not only because these stations set higher
prices but also because their presence will give rise to overpricing by local competitors.
The opposite occurs with the self-advertised as “low-cost” stations. Policy measures
promoting the gradual exit of stations associated with the dominant companies seem
quite reasonable in view of the commitment to the transition toward transport decar-
bonization.
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1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the better design of competition policies
in the retail fuel industry by exploring to what extent certain classes of gas stations
operating in Spain could have di↵erent e↵ects on their competitors’ prices. Our study
focuses on this country because its transport fuel prices (net of taxes) are systemati-
cally among the highest in Europe, although policy authorities have been developing
sectorial rules aimed at improving the degree of competition.
More specifically, the importance of this problem can be illustrated by comparing
the Spanish prices with those of the main fuel-consuming countries in the European
Union (EU-28). For instance, according to a recent report on the sector (December,
2018),1 it can be observed that pre-tax prices for diesel (gasoline) are 11.71% (17.81%)
higher than in Germany, 9.67% (9.19%) higher than in France, and 16.02% (20%)
higher with respect to the United Kingdom. This is surprising considering that over
the last two decades the industry has experienced substantial legislative changes aimed
at limiting the expansion of networks belonging to the dominant operators, as well as
fostering the entry of fuel sellers. These legislative changes have been accompanied by
a 33% increase in the number of new stations since the mid-2000s,2 which has led to a
relatively high number of them. This can easily be highlighted by a comparison with
the three main fuel-consuming EU-28 countries indicated above. Thus, while Germany,
France, and the United Kingdom have about 227, 285, and 223 stations per million
vehicles, respectively, Spain has 349 stations per million.3
Reducing pre-tax prices on the basis of the number of sellers is not a straightfor-
ward policy task. In fact, it does not depend only on the price set by the entrant
(outgoing) seller, but also on their impact on competitors’ prices. The latter obvi-
ously cannot be directly observed from raw data on prices. If we turn to economic
1See the national competition authority report CNMC (2018).
2According to the information provided by the Spanish Association of Petroleum Products Operators
(AOP), corresponding to the period from 2006 to 2017.
3Data refer to December 2017. It can also be observed that the proportion of stations per inhabitant
in Spain is noticeably greater than in the other countries mentioned. For more information on data
sources and the evolution of these ratios, see Appendix A.
1
theory, the predictions are not unambiguous. For instance, the conventional models
in the spirit of Chamberlin’s monopolistic competition indicate that a higher density
of sellers implies lower prices. However, the opposite could also occur. According to
Rosenthal (1980), the existence of captive consumers by some class of sellers associated
to well-positioned brands can lead toward a price-increasing competition result. More-
over, following Chen and Riordan (2008), it is also conceivable to think that this last
outcome becomes more likely as consumers’ preferences for certain varieties increase.
The empirical literature on competition and retail fuel prices regularly found that
a greater number of stations operating within predefined geographical areas implies
lower prices (e.g., Barron et al., 2004; Hosken et al., 2008; Clemenz and Gugler, 2006;
Pennerstorfer, 2009). However, the estimated importance of this causal relationship
is quite heterogeneous. Both the incorporation of methodological improvements and
the context studied seem critical in the empirical results. In fact, on the one hand, it
should be kept in mind that outstanding advances have emerged and have occasionally
been considered since the early empirical works. So, for example, Tappata and Yan
(2017) address the endogeneity problem in the classical regression models used, while
Perdiguero and Borrell (2018) delineated the relevant geographical markets for each
seller based on a travel-time isochrone around each of them, which seems more realistic
than using Euclidean distances. On the other hand, the Spanish context that we are
concerned with here seems quite particular. It has been exposed to intensive liberaliza-
tion and competition measures, but they do not seem to have led to a very satisfactory
performance (e.g., Garc´ıa, 2010; Bello et al., 2018; Bernardo, 2018). Literature pro-
vides, however, some optimistic outcomes regarding the entry of a minority class of
stations. This refers to findings in Bernardo et al. (2014) from data collected from a
metropolitan area which suggest that the entry of the so-called “low-cost” stations and
those linked to supermarkets significantly decreases prices at their nearby stations. It
therefore remains to be confirmed whether this beneficial impact for prices occurs for
the whole of Spain. Moreover, in view of the expected evolution of fuel demand due to
the commitments to decarbonization, there is still a need to further explore whether it
is possible that the exit of some classes of stations could help to reduce prices. In line
with the theoretical papers mentioned above (i.e., Rosenthal, 1980; Chen and Riordan,
2008), it seems reasonable to further focus our attention on those stations associated
with the best-positioned brands.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide an
overview of the sectorial policies carried out to date with a description of the context
that was analyzed in each case. Additionally, we present relevant aspects of empirical
literature on the topic. In Section 3, we will specify an empirical model in accordance
with our aim and make the appropriate econometric considerations for its estimation.
Further, we will describe the database that we will use as well as the construction of
the variables. In Section 4 we will discuss our empirical outcomes, specifically, those
related to the diagnostic tests, baseline results, and some tests for robustness. Finally,
in Section 5 we will present the concluding remarks and policy implications under the
commitment to the transition toward decarbonization in road transport.
2. Background
2.1. Characteristics of the context
Since the abolition of the CAMPSA monopoly in 1992, its commercial network has
been distributed among other operating firms and the Spanish fuel oil sector began a
new stage in the long process toward liberalization. Since then, the policy authorities
have been generating new sectorial rules aimed at increasing the level of competition in
the distribution of liquid fuels, especially since the beginning of the past decade. For
example, they have been encouraging the entry of new stations in the retail market.
More particularly, the restriction of maintaining a separation of at least 20 kilometers
between stations included in the service areas of state roads was eliminated in 2001
(Royal Decree 114/2001), and the administrative procedures for obtaining new licenses
were divided into two stages: the first for large shopping centers, in 2000, (Royal
Decree-Law 6/2000, article 3) and the second for both shopping malls and areas of
industrial activity, since 2013 (Royal Decree-Law 4/2013).
Moreover, in recent years restrictions have also been established on opening new
retail locations and perpetuating existing ones for the major oil companies in the
country. Since the year 2000 (Royal Decree-Law 6/2000), a temporary containment
measure has been implemented to promote competition. Those wholesale operators
for which the number of stations in their distribution network exceeded 30% of the
total in the national territory could not increase the number of stations for a period
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of five years. If the percentage was between 15% and 30%, they could not expand the
number of stations for three years. These two constraints a↵ected stations linked with
the oil companies Repsol and Cepsa, respectively, whether under ownership or by an
exclusive contractual arrangement.4 Because the supply contracts were more recently
considered important barriers to expansion and the entry of alternative operators, they
were limited to a maximum duration of one year (extendable twice) as of 2014 (Royal
Decree-Law 4/2013). The expansion constraints were again tightened from 2016 on-
ward (Law 8/2015), which ultimately a↵ected both major operators. Particularly, new
rules indicated that those firms whose distribution network sells over 30% in a specific
province cannot open or acquire stations in that territory.
The set of measures outlined above have been accompanied by an increase in the
number of stations, which has been quite remarkable in recent years, in spite of the
important impact that the international financial crisis has had on demand. In par-
ticular, as we can see in Table 1, the total number of stations grew by more than 9%
between 2010 and 2016, which contrasts with what happened in other major Euro-
pean countries. For example, the number of stations fell by about -1.59% in Germany,
-7.06% in France, and -3.54% in United Kingdom during the above referenced period.5
Most of these recent entries in the Spanish retail market belong to brands other than
those that have traditionally been operating in the country. Thus, the overall market
structure has been gradually changing with regard to the composition of the types of
sellers. On the one hand, the pronounced rise in the number of independent retailers,
self-advertised as “low cost”, has been remarkable. On the other hand, there has been
only a slight reduction in the number of stations associated with the major operators
(Repsol and Cepsa). Specifically, the figure fell from 50% in 2010 to 45% in 2016.
This is not surprising taking into account the initial advantage derived from the net-
work that these oil companies received in 1992 from the state monopoly. Interestingly,
a non-negligible proportion of about a fifth of these stations operate under exclusive
4Dealer-owned stations can be associated with the wholesaler through an exclusive supply and image
contract. In these cases stations can be operated directly by dealers or by a wholesaler under a rental
agreement.
5This evolution can be obtained from the Mineralo¨lwirtschaftsverband, Union Franc¸aise des Industries
Pe´trolie`res, UK Petroleum Industry Association, and Fuels Europe.
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supply contracts,6, which provide oil operators with enough flexibility to sequentially
partner with di↵erent retailers in the territories in which the law allows them to do so
as their contractual agreements expire or are terminated.
Table 1: Number of sellers by brand in Spain
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Repsol 3,600 3,620 3,615 3,615 3,585 3,544 3,501
Cepsa 1,483 1,487 1,516 1,470 1,477 1,512 1,518
“Low-cost” brands: 285 294 373 403 473 534 584
Ballenoil 1 5 14 20 53 72 75
Petromiralles 16 13 63 63 61 62 63
Petroprix 0 0 0 3 9 20 33
Supermarkets 268 275 295 308 323 341 358
Other “low cost” 0 1 1 9 27 39 55
Others 4,870 4,908 4,920 5,129 5,177 5,357 5,585
Total 10,238 10,309 10,424 10,617 10,712 10,947 11,188
The total number of sellers and those associated with Repsol, Cepsa and supermarkets have
been collected from the annual reports of the Spanish Association of Petroleum Products
Operators (AOP). Data for Ballenoil, Petromiralles, Petroprix, and other “low-cost” brands
have been collected from the Hydrocarbons Geoportal of the Spanish Ministry for the
Ecological Transition. Supermarkets include Alcampo, Bonarea, Carrefour, E.Leclerc, Eroski,
Esclatoil, Gmoil, Makro, and Simply. Other “low-cost” sellers include those whose commercial
label contains the words “low cost”. Information refer to December 31 of each respective year.
Finally, it is interesting to note than pre-tax price di↵erences between the stations
associated with the major operators and the “low-cost” brands are notable. For exam-
ple, according to the Spanish Ministry for the Ecological Transition (December 2018),
diesel prices at Repsol and Cepsa stations are on average 10% and 12% higher than
6According to rough estimates based on the information contained in CNMC (2009), ruling 06060/2009
of the Spanish Court for the Defense of Competition, and the Spanish Association of Petroleum
Products Operators (AOP).
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those fixed by “low-cost” stations. Initially, this cannot be attributed to the hetero-
geneity of fuels, since their basic chemical composition is stipulated by current law
(Royal Decree 61/2006).7
2.2. Empirical literature
The retail fuel sector is one of the industries that has traditionally received most
attention from economists. This is not surprising given its high economic weight in
most countries. As can be seen in a survey by Eckert (2013), there are interesting issues
largely debated in the industrial economics field that have been analyzed from the re-
ality of this sector. Thus, for example, some of these empirically examined topics have
been cost pass-through asymmetries (e.g., Bacon, 1991, Bachmeier and Gri n, 2003;
Deltas, 2008), Edgeworth cycles (e.g., Noel, 2007; Noel, 2009; Lewis and Noel, 2011),
merger e↵ects (e.g., Coloma, 2002; Simpson and Taylor, 2008; Houde, 2012), regula-
tory impacts (e.g., Vita, 2000; Taylor and Fischer, 2003; Bernardo, 2018), competition
e↵ect on price dispersion (e.g., Lewis, 2008; Chandra and Tappata, 2011; Balaguer and
Ripolle´s, 2018a), as well as the e↵ect of competition on price levels. Since the early
works, the literature on this last topic has incorporated substantial methodological ad-
vances. Next, we highlight improvements in controlling for station-level characteristics,
determining local competitors, and treating endogeneity bias.
Collecting precise data on station-specific characteristics, in order to control for
price di↵erences that go beyond the impact derived from local competition, has at-
tracted much attention from researchers. Thus, besides detailed information on prices
set by stations, empirical works have also commonly collected identifications of brands
(e.g., Barron et al., 2004; Sen, 2005; Tappata and Yan, 2017). In several of them,
an additional e↵ort was made to use data on other potentially relevant characteristics.
Distance to refinery (Pennerstorfer, 2009), local per-capita income (Zimmerman, 2012),
local population (Tappata and Yan, 2017), or indicators of the type of seller such as
7Dominant brands frequently attribute these di↵erences to the introduction of voluntary additives in
their products. Even assuming a certain degree of product di↵erentiation, the present work is not
so much interested in the observable price di↵erences but in knowing how di↵erent classes of sellers
a↵ect their competitors’ prices. This last unobservable aspect is what will shed light for designing
appropriate rules oriented toward reducing the level of prices set by each type of station.
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convenience store or repair station (Barron et al., 2004) have also been considered.
Literature in this research area has also benefited from a modest but steadily growing
number of studies that have exploited panel data (e.g., Hastings, 2004; Hosken et al.,
2008; Lach and Moraga-Gonza´lez, 2017; Bernardo, 2018). While more degrees of free-
dom and sample variability is expected to improve the e ciency of the estimates, the
most important advantage of this latest generation of studies is the control of a broad
set of the unobserved characteristics.
Useful improvements have also been made in determining the relevant competitors
for each operating station. The procedure followed by Shepard (1991) in a paper mainly
devoted to price discrimination in retail fuel has been later applied by much of the em-
pirical research on the topic that we are addressing here. Specifically, those relevant
competitors are determined by generating a circle around each station. Sizes of the
circle are generally defined arbitrarily by authors, but they are kept reasonably small to
ensure that the sellers included within it can be viewed as substitutes for consumers.
For example, the influential work by Barron et al. (2004) computed the number of
neighboring gas sellers around each station within a 1.5-mile radius. While other au-
thors have alternatively considered grosser measures to define the relevant market for
each station, such as municipalities, administrative districts or commuter routes (e.g.,
Van Meerbeeck, 2003; Clemenz and Gugler, 2006; Cooper and Jones, 2007), the em-
pirical strategy adopted in Barron et al. (2004) has been incorporated in many papers
(e.g., Hosken et al., 2008; Pennerstorfer, 2009; Albalate and Perdiguero, 2015). Re-
cently, however, a more sophisticated approach based on geo-information technologies
has been exploited in a limited number of works. Specifically, both driving distances
(e.g., Tappata and Yan, 2017; Kvasnicˇka et al., 2018) and driving time (e.g., Perdiguero
and Borrell, 2018; Perdiguero and Borrell, 2019) have allowed authors to define local
markets in a more realistic way than by using simple Euclidean distances. The paper
by Perdiguero and Borrell (2019) can be considered of special importance for our pur-
pose since it seeks to delimit the relevant market for each gas station in Spain. Authors
specifically found that it is delineated by a 5- to 6-min travel-time isochrone around
each seller.
Avoiding potential endogeneity bias has been another interesting challenge in this
literature. Although the problem derived of possible reverse causality from prices to
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the number of sellers has often been explicitly recognized (e.g., Barron et al., 2004,
Hosken et al., 2008), it has rarely been addressed. Authors are likely to expect the
bias to be small or, as suggested in Clemenz and Gugler (2006), insignificant. But
this does not always seems to be true. In fact, the paper by Tappata and Yan (2017)
indicates that ignoring endogeneity leads to serious underestimation of the e↵ect of
sellers on local average prices. Specifically, depending on the model specification used,
it is shown that bias is around 55% to 70%.
Regarding the results on the e↵ect of competitive pressure on price level, empirical
literature o↵ers consistent findings, at least with respect to the sign of this relationship.
These results regularly indicate that more competition derived from the number of sta-
tions in a delimited geographical area is negatively associated with retail fuel prices
or gross margins on wholesale prices (e.g., Barron et al., 2004; Clemenz and Gugler,
2006; Cooper and Jones, 2007; Sen and Townley, 2010; Nowakowski and Karasiewicz,
2016; Tappata and Yan, 2017; Bernardo, 2018). For example, estimates in Barron
et al., 2004 indicate that a 50% increase in the number of competitors within a 1.5-
mile radius around a station implies a decrease in the price of that station by about
0.5%. However, the magnitude of this impact is quite heterogeneous in the literature,
suggesting that their importance is largely dependent on particularities of the context
under analysis.
The Spanish context is particularly characterized by a relatively high number of
stations which mostly belong to two operating brands (as can be seen in sub-section
2.1). This situation probably induces less e↵ective competition than one would expect
from the observed number of stations.8 At least this is what emerges from previous
research. The dynamics of pricing in retailing constitute one of the essential supports
for this idea. Pricing behavior is found to be basically dependent on the strategy of the
two dominant companies, which together respond faster to changes in wholesale fuel
prices than other competitors (Balaguer and Ripolle´s, 2018a). Their price leadership
is quite consistent with early research highlighting the capacity to generate collusive
agreements in this market (Garc´ıa, 2010). In addition, it may have facilitated two
8Regardless of any further absence of e↵ective competition in upstream markets (those including the
activities of refining, transportation, storage, and distribution to the pump location of fuel products).
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particular pricing anomalies that took place, at least for relatively recent periods, at
the beginning of 2010. First, there was a behavior consisting in cutting prices on Mon-
days, the day on which the European Commission collected data to monitor the sector,
and then sharply increasing them again on Tuesdays (Jime´nez and Perdiguero, 2014).
Second, there was also an asymmetric price response to wholesale price changes which
took the form of the well-known ”rockets and feathers” phenomenon during the first
week of adjustments (Balaguer and Ripolle´s, 2016).
Evidence on the performance of the retail market and its evolution also support a
low degree of e↵ective competition. On the one hand, literature o↵ers us two studies
indicating that neither the e↵ects of the economic crisis as of 2008 nor the relaxation
of entry restrictions a few years later have been able to cut the substantial gross retail
margins to any significant degree.9 Specifically, the paper by Bello et al. (2018) reveals
that those stations belonging to companies with broad market power have tended to in-
crease their gross margins during the beginning of the recessive period in order to o↵set
the drop in consumption, which resulted in the generation of greater price di↵erences
between the various sorts of stations. The paper by Bernardo (2018) further suggests
that the reforms undertaken in 2013 (Royal Decree-Law 4/2013) had a limited impact
on the gross margins of stations. Indeed, the entry of more than one station in local
areas has hardly any marginal e↵ects, and any that had an initial impact ended up
being diluted to a great extent. Specifically, it was revealed that the average reduction
in gross retail margins has been only 0.75% one year after the first entry of a new seller
in local markets.
Lastly, we also benefit from findings regarding specific stations linked to supermar-
kets and those designated as “low cost”. These findings refer to those obtained in
Bernardo et al. (2014), from data on the metropolitan area of Barcelona (Spain). It is
suggested that this class of sellers impose a significant discipline on the prices of the
stations near them. Although as the authors themselves point out this outcome should
be taken with caution due to possible endogeneity bias, it seems quite reasonable and
interesting for our purpose. In fact, it is broadly consistent with outcomes previously
9The gross retail margin can be defined as the percentage di↵erence between retail (pre-tax) prices
and wholesale spot prices quoted in reference markets.
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obtained from similar classes of stations operating in countries such as Austria (Pen-
nerstorfer, 2009) and the USA (Zimmerman, 2012).
3. Methodology and data
Inspired by the empirical studies that use a circular approach around a seller to
define their relevant competitors in the local market (e.g., Shepard, 1991; Barron et al.,
2004; Lewis, 2008; Balaguer and Pern´ıas, 2013; Lach and Moraga-Gonza´lez, 2017), we
ask ourselves about the e↵ect of a particular type of seller on the average prices of the
surrounding competitors. Therefore, we formulate a baseline specification where the
logarithm of the average price fixed by the competitors of a seller i at time t can be
expressed as:
ln(P it) = ↵ +
MX
m=1
 mCLASSm,it +
MX
m=1
 mln(Nm,it) + ✓t +  z + uit (1)
where ↵ is a constant term, and CLASSm represents a set of dummy variables
m = 1, 2...,M that take a value of 1 if seller i belongs to class m, and 0 otherwise.
Their associated coe cients (i.e.,  m) represent the impact of each seller’s class. More-
over, the price in the local environment surrounding i is also expected to depend on
the market size and composition. With the aim of controlling for both these factors,
we have introduced information on the number of competitors from each of the di↵er-
ent classes. Therefore, ln(Nm) refers to the logarithm of 1 plus the number of sellers
belonging to class m that operate in the local environment surrounding seller i. Time
fixed e↵ects, ✓t, can be useful to capture the impact from the regular wholesale price
changes, while spatially clustered (ZIP-code) fixed e↵ects,  Z , control for the charac-
teristics of the neighborhood where the seller is located (e.g., transportation costs from
the supply center or local demand idiosyncrasy). Finally, uit is the random disturbance
term, which captures the influence of other unobserved variables.
The estimation of the above specification requires some considerations. First, to
avoid perfect collinearity, we have chosen to refer  m with respect the mean e↵ect
caused by all classes of sellers. That is,
PM
m=1  m = 0. This strategy will facilitate
the interpretation of coe cients. So, by introducing this consideration in Eq. (1), the
specification can be finally redefined as:
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ln(P it) = ↵ +
M 1X
m=1
 mclassm,it +
MX
m=1
 mln(Nm,it) + ✓t +  z + uit (2)
where classm,it (i.e. CLASSm,it CLASSM,it) represents a set of dummy variables
m = 1, 2...,M   1, that takes a value of 1 if seller i belongs to class m, a value of -1
if seller i belongs to class M , and 0 otherwise. Therefore, the coe cient associated to
the sellers’ class M is now dropped.
Second, although for the sake of simplicity Eq.(2) will be initially estimated by
ordinary least squares (OLS) as in much of the literature in this research area, we
acknowledge that the validity of the exogeneity of right-hand variables with respect
to prices could not be fulfilled. Namely, both price and sellers in a market could
be simultaneously determined since high (low) price levels could appeal (drive away)
prospective entrants, and conversely.10 To overcome this concern, we will also estimate
Eq.(2) by using instrumental variables (IV). Finally, as can occur in this sort of model,
we will further take into account that uit could be heteroskedastic, as well as spatially
and temporally correlated.
Regarding data, they are mainly collected from the Hydrocarbons Geoportal of
the Spanish Ministry for the Ecological Transition (www.geoportalgasolineras.es).
This website contains information provided by each gas station operating on the Span-
ish peninsula, all of which are required to submit their retail prices every Monday and
when price changes take place (Ministerial Order ITC/2308/2007). Although the web-
site only provides real-time information and historical series are not publicly available
for confidentiality reasons, we have collected complete information for every gas station
daily between December 2010 and July 2016. The resulting dataset is an unbalanced
panel comprising information on diesel prices, coordinates, and brand identity for a
maximum of 10,876 gas stations over the sampled time period.11 Because we are only
10Despite this simultaneity problem also being acknowledged in the literature, it is not always ad-
dressed empirically (e.g., Barron et al., 2004, Kwoka and Shumilkina, 2010, Zimmerman, 2012). In
favor of these works we can say that, according to Clemenz and Gugler (2006), this issue may not
be particularly relevant in this sort of model.
11Some observations have obviously been lost due to temporary closures (e.g., holidays and/or repair
work) or departures of stations.
11
interested in the pricing behavior of stations, all taxes have been excluded in accor-
dance with the information available from the Spanish Tax Agency.12
In order to build the variables of Eq. (2) from our data, it is necessary to group the
stations by brand type and define the relevant local market. With regard to the first
purpose, we believe that two aspects should be conciliated, namely, obtaining a final
model that is su ciently parsimonious to avoid further complication in the estima-
tion process, and introducing groups that are su ciently homogeneous, at least in the
brands of interest, to provide a useful answer to our objective. So, we consider it essen-
tial to obtain information about the e↵ect of three classes of brands on local markets.
On the one hand, the first group of brands includes Repsol and Cepsa. We consider
that they are the most well-positioned brands. Both brands belong to traditional oil
firms, which are vertically integrated, and have the largest network of stations on the
Spanish peninsula. On the other hand, the brands that are advertised as “low cost” are
presumably another relatively homogeneous group in terms of pricing behavior, whose
possible e↵ect on local competitors could be of special interest. Finally, the remaining
stations will be considered as another group.
The other challenge we face is to define as accurately as possible the relevant local
market around each sampled gas station. With this purpose in mind, we take as a
reference the recent empirical paper by Perdiguero and Borrell (2018), whose findings
suggest that the relevant market in the Spanish fuel sector is delineated by a 5-min
driving time isochrone surrounding each gas station.13 Then, information on the coor-
dinates from our dataset is exploited to define 5-min isochrones around each sampled
station by using the Open Source Routing Machine software (www.project-osrm.org),
which is based on the shortest car route in accordance with the road networks and speed
12The Spanish taxes for diesel fuel include indirect and special excise duties. The former is given by
the value added tax (VAT), ranging from 16% to 18% from July 1st 2010, and from 18% to 21%
since September 1st 2012. The latter is composed of a general rate (0.307 euros/liter), a State rate
(0.024 euros/liter), and a regional rate that depends on each autonomous government. A summary
of the regional tax rates prevailing during the sample period is given in Table B1 from Appendix B.
13This implies an approximate travel distance of 4 and 10 kilometers in urban and interurban roads
with speed limits of 50 and 120 km/h, respectively. It is quite consistent with the result obtained
by the circular approach followed in Balaguer and Ripolle´s (2018b).
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limits available at OpenStreetMap.
Once the sellers have been grouped and the relevant local market defined, we iden-
tify those neighboring stations with which each seller competes on a daily basis within
their corresponding isochrone. With this information, on the one hand, we obtain the
average prices of the competitors (ln(P it)) and, on the other hand, we quantify the
number of surrounding stations belonging to each class considered (i.e., Repsol, Cepsa,
“low cost”, and others). For descriptive purposes, in Table 2 we show the sample an-
nual averages for prices and number of local competitors in the defined markets. As
can be seen, stations associated to Repsol and Cepsa are surrounded by a relatively
smaller number of competitors, which are also more expensive than the overall average.
The opposite is observed in the case of “low-cost” stations, which are surrounded by
relatively more competitors with lower prices. Even so, one can appreciate how the
presence of competitors around all classes of sellers has progressively increased, with-
out exception, over the period of time considered. Hence, for example, the average
number of local competitors has increased by about 22% for Repsol and Cepsa, 52%
for “low-cost” brands, and 29% for the remaining class of sellers. Finally, we also ex-
amine the stationary properties of these variables. To do so, the Im et al. (2003) unit
root test has been applied on the demeaned series, which accounts for certain forms of
cross-sectional dependence. The corresponding test results suggest that our series are
stationary (as can be seen in Table C1 in Appendix C).
Table 2: Average prices (and number of competitors) 5-min around each class of seller
Repsol Cepsa “Low cost” Others
December 2010 0.950 (1.669) 0.949 (1.698) 0.947 (2.430) 0.948 (1.972)
2011 1.038 (1.702) 1.038 (1.748) 1.035 (2.545) 1.037 (2.018)
2012 1.096 (1.751) 1.096 (1.788) 1.093 (2.667) 1.095 (2.082)
2013 1.068 (1.795) 1.067 (1.802) 1.060 (2.806) 1.065 (2.164)
2014 1.018 (1.861) 1.018 (1.877) 1.008 (3.114) 1.013 (2.276)
2015 0.865 (1.951) 0.865 (1.988) 0.856 (3.518) 0.861 (2.433)
January - July 2016 0.762 (2.034) 0.761 (2.094) 0.755 (3.697) 0.757 (2.538)
Authors’ elaboration based on data from the Spanish Ministry for the Ecological Transition.
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4. Estimation
4.1. Baseline results
We carry out the estimation of Eq. (2) by using the OLS and IV procedures.
The corresponding results are shown in Table 3.14 In both estimation procedures we
have applied the covariance matrix estimation proposed by Driscoll and Kraay (1998),
which yields a robust covariance matrix estimation with heteroskedasticity and very
general forms of temporal and cross-sectional dependence when, as in our case, the
time dimension is large. The reason for this is that, by applying the groupwise het-
eroskedasticity test of Greene (2000), the serial correlation test of Wooldridge (2010),
and the cross-sectional dependence statistic (CD) proposed by Pesaran (2004),15 these
problems have been significantly revealed.
While the e ciency of the OLS estimator is slightly higher, the IV procedure will be
more appropriate if there is endogeneity. For this last procedure, we use a city-specific
population as an instrumental variable of the variation in the number of retailers, in line
with other research on the issue, such as Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005), Clemenz
and Gugler (2006), and Sen and Townley (2010).16 Second, taking advantage of panel
data information (e.g., Evans et al., 1993, Reed, 2015), we also employ the six-month
lagged values for brand class identity (classm,it) and for the number of local competitors
(ln(Nm,it)). We are aware that the reliability of the IV procedure depends on the use
of appropriate instruments, which should be exogenous and su ciently correlated with
the endogenous regressors. A set of diagnostic tests presented in the bottom panel of
Table 3 indicates that the instruments used are adequate. Specifically, from the Hansen
J test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that instruments are uncorrelated with the
error term at the standard signification levels suggesting then that the instruments
employed are exogenous, while the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is well above
14Note that the relative e↵ect corresponding to the class of stations dropped in the Eq. (2) is given by
minus the sum of the coe cients associated with the rest of classes (i.e., classothers =  classRepsol 
classCepsa   classlow cost), while their corresponding standard error has been obtained through the
delta method.
15Specific values for these tests are, respectively,  2(7961) = 72 ⇥ 1014, F (1, 7944) = 240, 403.2, and
CD = 56, 836.1.
16Data on the city-specific population has been drawn from the Spanish National Statistics Institute.
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the conventional rule of thumb (F > 10) proposed by Staiger and Stock (1997), indi-
cating a su ciently strong correlation between our instruments and the regressors that
are presumed to be endogenous. Moreover, the validity of our set of instruments also
depends on whether our resulting model is identified. Rejection of the null hypothesis
of the model’s under-identification in the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM test suggests that
this is the case (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006). Finally, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test
suggests that the OLS estimates might be inconsistent, probably due to some degree
of simultaneity between prices and sellers.
Therefore, taking the above mentioned diagnostic tests into account, here we focus
on the IV estimates presented in Table 3, despite the apparent similarities with those
obtained from OLS. The first thing that draws our attention is that, with a high level
of confidence, the e↵ects exerted by the presence of each class of seller are not equal to
each other. Regardless of the number of stations and the proportion of each class in
the local market, the relative e↵ects of stations belonging to the dominant networks are
significantly positive. Specifically, the presence of a Repsol station increases prices in
its surrounding competitors by 0.058% above the average e↵ect of the stations. In the
case of a Cepsa station, the results show that the impact runs in the same direction.
This last type of station relatively increases the prices of surrounding competitors by
0.097%. These results contrast with those corresponding to “low-cost” stations. In
this last case, competitors’ prices after the entry of one of these stations relatively
decrease by 0.194%. As we know, the rest of the stations have been captured by the
variable classothers. Because this last group is quite heterogeneous and numerous, it
is not surprising that their corresponding coe cient is not significantly di↵erent from
the average e↵ect at the conventional levels of significance.
The signs of the corresponding coe cients associated with the variables that help
us to control the number and composition of competitors across local markets are what
we expected. They are clearly consistent with both the prices fixed by each class of
stations and, according to the coe cients just discussed, with their relative e↵ect on
the neighboring sellers. Specifically, a new competitor belonging to the dominant net-
work will cause an increase in the competitors’ average price that is consistent with
their higher price as well as the relatively positive impact on the prices of their nearby
sellers. The opposite situation would occur with the entry of stations belonging to the
15
“low-cost” brands or even with stations within the general classification of other brands.
Finally, note that the patterns exhibited by those stations associated with the dom-
inant network could be consistent with the theoretical models that contemplate the
existence of captive consumers who are unwilling to substitute certain well-positioned
brands (e.g., Rosenthal, 1980; Chen and Riordan, 2008). The greater presence of sta-
tions associated with Repsol and Cepsa, as well as the higher capacity for expenditure
on advertising of these two companies, could positively contribute to enhance the brand
values perceived by consumers, which would to some extent account for the results ob-
tained concerning the dominant sellers.
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Table 3: Baseline results
OLS IV
classRepsol 0.083⇤⇤⇤ (0.030) 0.058⇤ (0.033)
classCepsa 0.111⇤⇤⇤ (0.037) 0.097⇤⇤ (0.039)
classlow cost -0.244⇤⇤⇤ (0.055) -0.194⇤⇤⇤ (0.060)
classothers 0.051 (0.054) 0.039 (0.058)
ln(NRepsol) 0.896⇤⇤⇤ (0.055) 0.926⇤⇤⇤ (0.059)
ln(NCepsa) 0.626⇤⇤⇤ (0.049) 0.674⇤⇤⇤ (0.054)
ln(Nlow cost) -2.479⇤⇤⇤ (0.089) -2.378⇤⇤⇤ (0.099)
ln(Nothers) -1.024⇤⇤⇤ (0.048) -0.975⇤⇤⇤ (0.051)
R2 0.979 0.980
Time observations 2,070 1,888
Total observations 11,964,618 10,482,118
Hansen J 1.244 [0.265]
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 11,000 [0.000]
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 243.991 [0.000]
Durbin-Wu-Hausman 5,839.66 [0.000]
H0 :  1 = ... =  M 20.60 [0.000] 11.10 [0.011]
Dependent variable is the average price of surrounding competitors. All
regressions include a constant term, and dummy variables for time and ZIP
codes. Estimated coe cients and standard errors are multiplied by 102.
Standard errors for classothers coe cients are obtained by using the delta
method. Driscoll-Kraay’s standard errors with 6 lags in the autocorrelation
structure are presented in parenthesis. We use ⇤⇤⇤, ⇤⇤, and ⇤ to denote
statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. P-values
are in brackets.
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4.2. Robustness check
In this section, we are first interested in knowing whether, by using the IV pro-
cedure as it has been defined so far, the results presented in Table 3 remain robust
to the introduction of some dynamics in our model, and also to changing competitors
that are considered relevant. More concretely, on the one hand, we extend the Eq. (2)
by including the lagged dependent variable as an additional regressor.17 In this case,
long-run impacts can also be calculated in order to facilitate the comparison with those
coe cients obtained in the baseline analysis. That is, by assuming that ⇢ is the coe -
cient of the lagged dependent variable, we will multiply the parameters capturing the
short-run impact by 1/(1 ⇢). On the other hand, we alternatively delineate local mar-
kets within a 2.5-minute driving distance of the geographical location of each station.
A reduction of time with respect to the period used in the baseline analysis (which
is in accordance with Perdiguero and Borrell (2019)) seems more in line with several
previous works. In fact, this involves a travel distance of about 2 and 5 kilometers
in urban and interurban roads with speed limits between 50 and 120 km/h, respec-
tively. It is interesting to note that in papers such as Barron et al. (2004), Hosken
et al. (2008) markets are defined in a 2.4-km (1.5-mile) radius around the station,
and in both Hastings (2004) and Bernardo (2018) only a 1.6-km (1-mile) radius was
considered. Therefore, new variables for both the average competitors’ price (ln(P it))
and the number of each station class are constructed according to the new size of the
isochrone. So, on this occasion we have approximately half of the observations of the
baseline analysis because many stations have been excluded as they are now assumed
to act as spatial monopolies.
The estimates from considering a dynamic model and smaller local markets are
firstly displayed in Table 4. In both cases, diagnostic tests confirm the model’s identi-
fication and the suitability of the IV estimator over OLS. In the dynamic model, the
coe cient associated with the lagged dependent variable is positive and statistically
significant (at a 1% level), which suggests a remarkable persistence of retail prices over
17It is well known that standard panel estimators with a lagged dependent variable can yield biased
coe cients when the time dimension (T ) is small and the cross-sectional dimension (N) tends to
infinity. However, this bias is expected to be negligible in our analysis given the reasonably large
number of time periods. See Nickell (1981), Kiviet (1995), and Judson and Owen (1999).
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time. After calculating the long-run coe cients, we can see that they are quite similar
to those provided by the previous baseline analysis. Additionally, after reducing the
size of local markets, our findings remain quite robust. Namely, once controlled for the
number of sellers and their composition, the relative e↵ects exerted by the presence of
each class of station are not statistically equal to each other. Particularly, we find that
the presence of stations associated with Repsol and Cepsa relatively increases the prices
fixed by its surrounding competitors, while “low-cost” brands cause the opposite e↵ect.
Finally, we ask ourselves how robust results would be in response to a di↵erent
choice of instrumental variables in the estimation process. Specifically, we have de-
cided to use as instruments the six-month lagged values for the brand class identity
(classm,it) and the number of local competitors ln(Nm,it)), without considering the
city-specific population. The results obtained from this exactly identified case are pre-
sented at the last columns of Table 4.18 Interestingly, the relative impacts of each
class of station are not statistically equal to each other. Once again, the signs of these
impacts are consistent with those obtained in the baseline analysis.
18In this case, note that we cannot test the exogeneity assumption of instruments.
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5. Conclusions and policy implications
Despite the policy e↵orts made in Spain to implement measures aimed at increasing
competition in the retail fuel market, the country is among those that regularly have
the highest pre-tax prices in the EU. Market structure, behavior, and performance in-
dicators suggest that even with the intensive entry of new sellers, the retail distribution
of transport fuel in this country is far from competitive. To be able to introduce ad-
equate measures to increase e↵ective competition, we first need to know which sellers
notably contribute to it and which sellers do not. With this purpose in mind, we have
built a parsimonious model which helps to reveal the ability of certain types of stations
to change their near competitors’ prices. On the one hand, we have explored the dif-
ferential impact derived from the presence of those stations associated with vertically
integrated companies that have a dominant presence in the retail market (i.e., Repsol
and Cepsa) and, on the other hand, from those stations that advertise themselves as
“low-cost” brands.
Our main empirical analysis is based on more than ten million observations cor-
responding to the variables of interest, which were collected daily between late 2010
and mid-2016. Namely, we refer to data on diesel prices, brands, and the geographical
location of the stations operating on the Spanish peninsula. Prices are subsequently
expressed excluding the corresponding general, special, and regional fuel oil taxes. In
addition, we exploit the Open Source Routing Machine service to precisely delineate
reasonable local markets within a 5-minute driving distance of the geographical loca-
tion of each gas station. After controlling for heterogeneity in the number of each
type of competitor, and by using standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity,
temporal and cross-sectional dependence, we focus our attention on estimates obtained
by the IV procedure to prevent simultaneity bias.
The empirical findings suggest that each type of gas station contributes di↵erently
to competitors’ prices in local markets. On the one hand, the entry of stations which
belong to the network of any of the two dominant operators is less favorable to de-
creasing competitors’ prices than the entry of any other type of gas station. In fact,
our results indicate that their presence would cause competitors’ prices to relatively
increase in comparison with the average impact that would result from the presence
of a representative gas station. On the other hand, those stations advertised as “low
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cost” significantly impact in the opposite direction. In other words, this last group of
sellers does not only fix prices generally below the average in consistence with their
label, but also produces relative downward e↵ects on the prices of local competitors.
The importance of the e↵ect exerted by “low-cost” stations gives us an idea of the
aggressive competition they cause. We have further verified that these outcomes are
robust to the introduction of some dynamics in the model, redefinition of the size of
the relevant geographic markets, and the use of alternative instrumental variables.
With the aim of evaluating the implications for future policies in the sector, it seems
advisable to take into account the foreseeable context that will have to be faced in the
coming decades. By this we are referring to the expected contraction of demand for
fossil fuels as a result of decarbonization policies, which will end up causing a reduction
in the number of stations. This is what can be expected, at the very least, from the
draft of the Spanish Integrated Energy and Climate Plan (2021-2030). As reported
in this plan, the need for fossil fuels for motor vehicles at the end of the next decade
will have substantially decreased due to changes in means of transport as well as to
the introduction of electric vehicles. Specifically, it estimates that 16% of all vehicles
running on Spanish roads will be electric or will use advanced biofuels by 2030, which
contrasts with the less than 1% of this type of vehicles currently being driven in Spain.
Moreover, according to a recent communication released by the European Commission
(COM/2018/773 final), the objective is that zero emissions from the entire fleet of
vehicles will be achieved by 2050. Consequently, given the foreseeable scenario of a
contraction in oil demand, it seems appropriate to initially promote the exit of stations
belonging to the two dominant firms in order to reduce pre-tax prices. The e↵ect on
price levels would then be determined through two channels. On the one hand, lower
prices would be obtained since these types of stations are among the most expensive
in the industry. And on the other hand, the e↵ect on competitors’ prices would also
be relatively favorable to reducing pre-tax prices.
Even though the network expansion of these two dominant firms has been con-
strained by current legislation in certain provinces (Law 8/2015), this measure does
not appear to be su cient. The relocation of these types of sellers to local areas with
a higher density of competitors could even cause undesirable e↵ects on price levels.
One possible recommendation is to prevent the creation and the renewal of flagging
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contracts with the above mentioned dominant companies. In fact, an important part
of the stations operating in their networks are owned by dealers. Those stations that
do not renew their contracts could, however, remain in the market as an independent
brand as long as the demand allows them to do so. After all, we must bear in mind
that the e ciency gains of the remaining type of stations would come from both their
lower prices and, if they adopt a “low-cost” strategy, their higher gains on the prices
of the surrounding competitors.
Finally, it should be underlined that any gain in pre-tax price reduction does not
seem advisable to be transferred to consumers. At least this could be justified from
an environmental point of view. Namely, the literature has highlighted that any re-
duction in petroleum product prices for consumers would have significant undesirable
implications on the country’s carbon emissions (Balaguer and Cantavella, 2016). Also
it should be kept in mind that a decrease in fuel prices is likely to discourage the in-
corporation of new fuel-saving vehicles to the fleet (e.g. Rivers and Schaufele, 2017).
Therefore, it seems more appropriate that any market e ciency improvement derived
from lower prices should be transferred to other productive sectors by exploiting the
tax capacity gains on each unit sold. This is particularly feasible in Spain, where the
current tax rates on fuel oil are lower than the EU average.
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Appendix A
Table A1: Stations per million inhabitants (Inh.) and vehicles
Spain Germany France UK
Inh. Vehicles Inh. Vehicles Inh. Vehicles Inh. Vehicles
2006 198 343 184 308 214 372 162 284
2017 247 349 175 227 167 285 128 223
% variation 24.75 1.75 -4.89 -26.30 -21.96 -23.39 -20.99 -21.48
The number of stations has been taken from National Oil Industry Associations (refer-
ring to December 31 of each year); the population was obtained from Eurostat; and the
vehicles in use were collected from the Spanish Direccio´n General de Tra´fico, the German
Federal Motor Transport Authority (Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt), the French Comite´ des
Constructeurs Franc¸ais d’Automobiles, and the Society of Motor Manufacturers and
Traders in UK.
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Appendix C
Table C1: Results of Im-Pesaran-Shin panel unit root test
ln(P it) ln(NRepsol) ln(NCepsa) ln(Nlow cost) ln(Nothers)
-290⇤⇤⇤ [0.000] -220⇤⇤⇤ [0.000] -43.921⇤⇤⇤ [0.000] -41.213⇤⇤⇤ [0.000] -430⇤⇤⇤ [0.000]
Cross-sectional dependence is controlled by subtracting cross-sectional means from the observed data
(demeaned data), while serial autocorrelation is taken into account by considering the optimal lag
length according to the Akaike Information Criteria. Superscripts ⇤⇤⇤, ⇤⇤, and ⇤ denote rejection
of the null hypothesis (all the panels contain a unit root) at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.
P-values are in brackets.
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